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The question of wage diﬀerentials by ﬁrm size has been studied for several decades with no
commonly accepted explanations for why large ﬁrms pay more. In this paper, we reexamine
the relationship between ﬁrm-size and wage outcomes by estimating the returns to unmea-
sured ability between large and small ﬁrms. Our empirical methodology, based on non linear
instrumental variable estimations, allows us to directly estimate the returns to unmeasured
ability by ﬁrm size and therefore to test the two main theories of wage determination proposed
to explain the relationship between ﬁrm size and wages, namely ability sorting and job screen-
ing. We use data from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) which provides
longitudinal information on workers and ﬁrms characteristics including establishment and ﬁrm
size. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the returns to unmeasured ability across ﬁrm size. In
particular, we ﬁnd that the returns to unmeasured ability seem to follow a non linear pattern.
The returns to unmeasured ability are signiﬁcantly higher in medium size (above 500 but below
1000 workers) ﬁrms relative to small ﬁrms. However, the returns to unmeasured ability are
not signiﬁcantly greater in large ﬁrms relative to medium or small ﬁrms. Overall, it seems that
ability sorting dominates for moves from small to medium size ﬁrms in that ability is more
productive and therefore more rewarded in the latter than the former. On the other hand,
when ﬁrms become “too large”, the monitoring costs hypothesis seems to dominate in that
ability is not more rewarded than in smaller ﬁrms.
JEL codes: J31 J33 J41 J62
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1 Introduction
The existence of ﬁrm-size wage diﬀerentials, the observation that ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes pay
diﬀerent wages for observationally equivalent workers, is a widely documented fact in the
empirical literature on wage determination. These studies generally ﬁnd that none of the ex-
planatory variables used in the wage equation can account for the existence of a size-wage gap. 1
As a result, the literature has concluded that the explanation resides in unmeasured factors
in the error term. This term might capture intrinsic diﬀerences in individual ability aﬀecting
workers decisions to join a large or a small ﬁrm. It may also represent diﬀerences between large
and small ﬁrms’ decisions to reward the various aspects of the workers’ skills. Two plausible
theories of wage determination oﬀer suggestions as to what this unmeasured factor might be.
The ﬁrst one is ability sorting, in which high ability workers have a comparative advantage in
larger ﬁrms, and the second is job screening, according to which greater monitoring costs in
larger ﬁrms implies lower reward associated with ability or any individual traits, diﬃcult to
measure on the job. So far, the literature has not been able to test any of these theories as
the empirical methods used either did not include an unmeasured ability term (simple OLS)
or attempted to diﬀerence it out using ﬁxed-eﬀects.
In this paper, we reexamine the relationship between ﬁrm-size and wage outcomes by
emphasizing the role of unmeasured (to the econometrician) ability and the non random allo-
cation of workers into ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. We apply GMM techniques to longitudinal data
on wages and beneﬁts and employer size to estimate and test for diﬀerences in the returns to
unmeasured ability between large and small ﬁrms. The method based on non linear instru-
1Even in the most recent empirical literature using richer data on human capital aspects such as the presence
of training opportunities (Hu (2003)), on-the-job-search (Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1999)) or better in-
formation on the employer side using matched employer-employee data (Troske (1999)), the size-wage premium
cannot be fully explained by any of the factors analyzed.2
mental variables permits a direct estimation of the returns to unmeasured aspects of skills.
This will allow us to test the two main theories of wage determination proposed to explain the
relationship between ﬁrm size and wages, namely ability sorting and job screening.
The estimated size-wage premium is about 15% in the United States and 10% in Canada.
Empirical studies investigating the source of this wage diﬀerential have analyzed the explana-
tory power of various factors related to worker and ﬁrm characteristics such as education,
unionization and industry type.2 These studies have been limited in two ways. First, they do
not allow for the possibility that human capital attributes may not be equally valued in large
and small ﬁrms. By doing so, they restrict the eﬀect of ﬁrm size on wages to being only a
shift parameter. Second, the use of ﬁxed-eﬀect estimations allows one to eliminate the bias
caused by the ability term (assuming it is time invariant and equally rewarded in large and
small ﬁrms) to estimate the eﬀects of other parameters. On the other hand, it does not allow
an estimation of ability eﬀects. Moreover, if large and small ﬁrms have diﬀerent wage policies
concerning their treatment of measured and unmeasured skills, then the ﬁxed-eﬀect method
does not eliminate the eﬀect of unmeasured ability on wage outcomes.
This paper addresses the particular role of ability in the wage policy decisions of large and
small ﬁrms in a framework of non random assignment of workers into ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes.
On the employer side, ﬁrms of diﬀerent size have distinct wage policies regarding the evaluation
of the various dimensions of human capital. On the workers side, individuals with a particular
set of skills have a comparative advantage in companies of a given size. In this framework,
both measurable (education and experience) and unmeasurable (initiative, ambition, loyalty)
human capital attributes are diﬀerently rewarded across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. Therefore,
individuals will self-select into large and small ﬁrms according to such policies and their own
endowment of measured and unmeasured skills.
2See Oi and Idson (1999) for a review of the literature on ﬁrm size and wages in the US.3
The two leading theories of wage determination used to explain the relationship between
ﬁrm size and wage outcomes, ability sorting and job screening, can be tested in a wage equa-
tion framework because each theory provides diﬀerent predictions in terms of the returns to
unmeasured skills or ability. According to the ability sorting argument, large ﬁrms attract high
ability workers because they need better workers as the execution of the diﬀerent production
processes in large ﬁrms is more complex than in small ﬁrms. 3 In addition, large ﬁrms have
more ways to attract better workers than small ﬁrms by providing promotion opportunities,
training and career development. 4 As a result, returns to unmeasured skills or ability should
be greater in large ﬁrms than in small ones. In the job screening hypothesis, larger ﬁrms have
higher monitoring costs than small ﬁrms which leads large ﬁrms to more highly value directly
observed skills (like education and experience) and value less unobservable skills compared to
small ﬁrms. 5 As a result, returns to ability should be smaller in large than in small ﬁrms, a
prediction opposite to the ability or productivity hypothesis.
The importance of worker self-selection in the analysis of ﬁrm size on wages has been
previously analyzed by Idson and Feaster (1990) using cross-sectional data from the 1979 May
3See Oi (1983) and Oi and Idson (1999) for a theoretical and empirical analysis of the productivity explanation
of the size-wage gap.
4See Gibbons (1998) for a review of the empirical literature on wage dynamics within organizations and the
role of ability in career development (fast-tracks). More recently, Agell (2003) conducts an empirical analysis
of the diﬀerences in compensation policies between small and large U.S. ﬁrms. The author ﬁnds evidence that
career ladders and the use of performance pay increases with ﬁrm size.
5See Garen (1985) for a theoretical model and an empirical test supporting this prediction. Barron, Black
and Loewenstein (1987) present evidence of a related implication of the monitoring costs hypothesis. They
ﬁnd that large employers screen applicants more extensively compared to small employers and provide higher
starting wages. More recently, Hu (2003) uses cross-sectional data from the Beneﬁts supplement of the CPS to
show that large employers hire younger workers than small employers and that the size-wage premium for newly
hired workers disappears for workers older than 35. Both empirical studies are consistent with the idea that
large ﬁrms use pre-hiring screening practices to reduce monitoring costs associated with on-the-job screening.4
CPS and Lluis (2003) comparing the size-wage structure in the U.S. and Canada with data
from the U.S. CPS and the Canadian LFS for the year 1998. The latter author ﬁnds a similar
wage structure in both countries as well as evidence of non random selection of workers into
ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. In both of these studies, the method used to characterize non random
selection is the Heckman two-step method. Although this method provides evidence of the
presence of workers non random selection, it does not provide any quantitative information on
the importance of unmeasured ability in the selectivity mechanism. Moreover, the selection
model is one-sided in that it characterizes workers’ decisions to join a ﬁrm but remains silent
on ﬁrms’ selection decisions. However, the overall eﬀect of ﬁrm size on wages depends on both
which types of workers tend to choose to work in a large or a small ﬁrm as well as the eﬀect
of ﬁrm size on the wages of diﬀerent types of workers.
The method we use in the paper relies on a panel data estimator estimated using GMM
techniques. It is appropriate for the analysis of multi-sector models of wage determination in
which the time-invariant component of the error term is diﬀerentially rewarded and selection
comes from both sides of the market. 6 This type of analysis requires panel data where a
suﬃciently large number of individuals can be observed for at least three time periods. Our
analysis is applied to longitudinal data from the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income
Dynamics (SLID) conducted over the period 1993 to 1998. This household survey provides
an extensive set of individual, job and ﬁrm characteristics and its panel aspect constitutes
a unique source of information for an analysis of the dynamic interactions of workers, ﬁrm
size, and wages. Previous studies analyzing the size-wage gap in Canada and the U.S. have
used cross-sectional data or only 2-year panels. 7 More recently, Troske (1999) analyzes the
6Lemieux (1998) applies the method to analyze the eﬀects of union sector choice on wages. Gibbons, Katz,
Lemieux and Parent (2002) use this method to analyze inter-occupation and inter-industry wage diﬀerentials.
Lluis (2002) uses the method to analyze the wage dynamics associated with worker choices of job ranks within
a company.
7See Oi and Idson (1999) for a review of the U.S. studies and Morissette (1993) for a study of the Canadian5
question using U.S. matched employer-employee data but reaches the same conclusions as the
preceding literature, ﬁnding a signiﬁcant size-wage premium after ruling out the usual suspects
and concluding on the possible importance of unmeasured workforce quality. Abowd, Finer
and Kramarz (1999) and Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) estimate a wage equation that
includes person-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved components using longitudinal data on
workers and ﬁrms in the state of Washington and France respectively. In the latter study,
they decompose the ﬁrm-size eﬀect into a size eﬀect due to an unobserved person eﬀect and an
unobserved ﬁrm eﬀect. Their estimation results show that the ﬁrm-size-average person eﬀect
explains better the size-wage gap than does the ﬁrm-size-average ﬁrm eﬀect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the framework of analysis. In the
ﬁrst part of this section, a statistical model of wage determination with non random assignment
of workers into ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes is presented and the diﬀerent interpretations of the size-
wage structure arising from ability sorting and job screening are discussed. The second part
of section two presents the estimation method used to estimate the statistical model. Section
three describes the data providing information on the sample selection rules, worker mobility
across ﬁrm size and an analysis of the size-wage gap in the same spirit as the empirical literature
on ﬁrm size and wage outcomes. Section four presents the results emphasizing the estimated
returns to measured skills and unmeasured ability and section ﬁve concludes.
2 Analytical Framework
In its attempt to explain the size-wage gap, the empirical literature on the eﬀect of ﬁrm size
on wages has not considered the possibility that large and small ﬁrms may have diﬀerent wage
policies in terms of rewarding workers skills. On the other hand, two main theories of wage
determination can justify diﬀerences in wage policies by ﬁrm size and in particular, diﬀerences
case.6
in the returns to measured and unmeasured skills based on the following assumptions. On the
one hand, ability sorting assumes that skills (measured and unmeasured) are not identically
productive across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes and in particular, high ability workers have a com-
parative advantage in large ﬁrms. On the other hand, job screening assumes that monitoring
costs increase with the size of the ﬁrm so that large ﬁrms put less weight on unmeasured
ability relative to small ﬁrms as it is harder to identify. This section summarizes these two
approaches in a statistical model of wage determination and present the econometric method
used to estimate the returns to ability and evaluate the importance of the ability sorting versus
job screening hypothesis in explaining the relationship between ﬁrm size and wages.
2.1 Implications of Ability Sorting and Screening in Wage Policy by Firm
Size
This section presents a statistical model of wage determination which integrates the notions
of ability sorting and job screening. The ability sorting argument follows the literature on
job assignment and workers comparative advantage ﬁrst proposed by Roy (1951) and later
formalized by Sattinger (1995). 8 The main assumption in this framework is that diﬀerent
skills (measured and unmeasured) are not equally productive across sectors and in the present
context, across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. Utility maximizing workers, in this framework, choose
the size of employer for which their abilities are best suited. In particular, high ability workers
are better suited in large ﬁrms. As a result, the returns to ability are greater in large ﬁrms
compared to small ﬁrms. Job screening and its implications for the analysis of the size-wage
relationship was theoretically developed by Garen (1985). The model relies on the assumption
that monitoring/evaluation costs increase with ﬁrm size. As a result, large ﬁrms acquire less
8See also Neal and Rosen (1998) for more details on selection models and their implications for the earnings
distribution.7
accurate information about the abilities of their workers, and thus will rely less heavily on their
own evaluation of workers than do small ﬁrms and more on other indicators of ability such as
schooling or experience.
The assumptions common to the two types of approaches are the following: There are
two types of ﬁrms which diﬀer by size. Firms are indexed by j = S(small), L(large). The
only input is labor, given in eﬃciency units per worker. Workers, indexed by i = 1,...,N, are
characterized by a vector of productive skills, (SKi,θi), where SKi denotes the observed skills
of worker i and θi represents traits that are unmeasured by the econometrician (these could
include innate ability, initiative, ambition, loyalty).
It is assumed that the production technology of ﬁrm j exhibits constant returns to scale






i(SKi)βj(θi)λj, j = S,L (1)
where Nj is the total number of employees in ﬁrm j and n
j
i is the number of employees in ﬁrm
j endowed with (SKi,θi). There is one type of output, the price of which is normalized to
one. The proﬁt maximizing condition for both types of ﬁrms implies the following conditions







In the ability sorting model, it is assumed that ability is perfectly observed by ﬁrms. 10
9It is assumed that ﬁrms of diﬀerent size have diﬀerent production technologies in terms of the sensitivity to
the skills required. The fact that both have constant returns to scale simpliﬁes the analysis. Other assumptions
on returns to scale would involve ﬁnding the optimal size for both ﬁrms which is beyond the scope of this paper.
10The model could be generalized to include imperfect information about ability and learning eﬀects in
the same spirit as the analysis in Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2001) for the eﬀect of industry and
occupational choice on wage outcomes.8
Moreover, worker skills, (SKi,θi), are exogenously given so that investment in human capital
is ignored. Workers then choose to work in a large (small) ﬁrm because they have a comparative
advantage in that type of ﬁrm.
In the job screening model, Garen (1985) proposes a model explaining the size-wage re-
lationship based on the same idea that ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes have diﬀerent wage policies.
The assumption used for justifying these diﬀerences in compensation policy is not based on
diﬀerences in skill sensitivity to technology (as it is in the ability model above) but on dif-
ferences in monitoring costs. It is assumed that large ﬁrms rely less heavily on their own
evaluation of workers ability than do small ﬁrms but instead rely more on more easily observed
other indicators of ability such as schooling or experience when making pay decisions. In this
approach, the eﬀect of measured and unmeasured skills on wage outcomes will vary by ﬁrm
size depending upon the degree of accuracy with which workers skills can be evaluated. More
precisely, ﬁrms face a cost to evaluating workers ability which increases with the size of the
ﬁrm. This assumption implies that large ﬁrms will reward schooling more and ability less
and their wage schedule will have a larger intercept. Note that Garen’s model goes beyond
the simple characterization of the compensation policies of ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes in that it
endogenizes schooling decisions. This part of the model is not detailed in the present paper
as it is not directly relevant to the empirical question of the returns to ability in the size-wage
relationship.
The idea of diﬀerent wage policies by ﬁrm size can be summarized in the following wage
equation:
wijt = αj + βjSKit + λjθi, j = S,L (3)
where (αj,βj,λj) is the vector of rewards to unmeasured and measured skills. The diﬀerent
restrictions on the coeﬃcients resulting from the two types of models can be described in terms
of the size-wage premium. The size-wage premium or equivalently, the gain from joining a large9
ﬁrm is characterized by:
Pit = (αL − αS) + (βL − βS)SKit + (λL − λS)θi (4)
According to the ability sorting model, the size-wage premium previously captured in the
empirical literature by the diﬀerential in the intercepts αj is in fact the result of the diﬀerential
returns to ability or the diﬀerence λL − λS. In a one-factor hierarchical ability model with
comparative advantage, it is assumed that λL > λS and αL < αS. Intuitively, small ﬁrms
have jobs for which the productivity required and therefore wage paid relies less on individual
ability than large ﬁrms. Note that in this model, there is no a-priori restrictions on the returns
to measured skills and both may be equal unless one assumes a particular correlation between
unmeasured and measured skills. One may expect ability to be positively correlated with
schooling and experience but other dimensions of ability like ambition or initiatives may not
be.
The size-wage structure implied by the job screening hypothesis results in the following
restrictions in the parameters: βL > βS, λL > λS and αL < αS. 11 A test of the job screening
versus ability sorting hypothesis in this context is therefore a test based on the comparison of
the α coeﬃcients or the returns to unmeasured skills by ﬁrm size. 12
2.2 Estimation Method
This section describes the estimation method used to estimate wage equation (3) described in
the previous section. Deﬁning Dijt as a dummy variable indicating whether individual i is in
11Note that the job screening model can be viewed as a version of a non hierarchical ability or multi-factor
ability sorting.
12Interpretation of the estimated constant and returns to measured skills are diﬃcult to make since each one
depends on the level of ability at which they are estimated which is unknown.10










Dijtλjθi + µit (5)
where J is a discrete variable describing diﬀerent categories of ﬁrm size and µit is a measurement
error independent of a worker’s choice of ﬁrm size. 13
Estimating equation (5) with OLS would give inconsistent estimates. Indeed, the compar-
ative advantage hypothesis implies that ﬁrm size assignment is endogenous, so θi is correlated
with the ﬁrm size dummies. In addition, this term cannot be eliminated by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing
(5) because it is interacted with the Dijt terms.
Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) analyze models in which a ﬁxed eﬀect is interacted
with year dummies and show that consistent estimates can be obtained by quasi-diﬀerencing
the equation of interest and using appropriate instrumental-variable techniques. This technique
has been used previously by Lemieux (1998) in the case where the return to a time-invariant
unobserved characteristic is diﬀerent in the union and non-union sector. We also apply this
technique to estimate the returns to ability by ﬁrm size.











Innate ability is time-invariant so its period t version is also equal to its lag version. To
obtain the quasi-diﬀerence, the ﬁrst lag version of (6) is substituted into equation (5) as follows:
13In the empirical analysis, we will consider three types of size categories: small, medium and large. The


















Dijt−1SKit−1βj ] + eit (7)






This equation cannot be estimated using non-linear least squares because wijt−1 is correlated
with µit−1. This problem can be solved by choosing appropriate instruments for wijt−1 in
which case consistent estimates will be obtained. The set of instruments, Zi, has to satisfy the
following condition:
E(eitZi) = 0 (9)
The objective is then to minimize the following quadratic form:
min
γ e(γ)0Z(Z0ΩZ)−1Z0e(γ) (10)
where Z0ΩZ is the covariance matrix of the vector of moments Z0e(γ), Ω is the covariance
matrix of the error term eit and γ is the vector of parameters. An eﬃcient estimator can be
obtained by estimating equation (5) in a ﬁrst step with Ω = I.
Finally, the unmeasured ability term θe
it in the error term of equation (5) is normalized to
zero for the parameters to be identiﬁed. 14 This is done by adding the following equation as a






θit = 0 (11)
where N is the number of individuals, T is the number of periods for each individual and θit
satisﬁes equation (6).
14A proof of the necessity of this constraint is given in Lemieux (1998).12
Instruments are chosen using the identiﬁcation assumption for estimation of panel data
equations that imposes strict exogeneity of right-hand side variables. More formally:
E(µit/SKi1...SKiT,Dij1...DijT,θi) = 0 (12)
The elimination of θi resulting from the quasi-diﬀerencing corrects the problem of endo-
geneity in the assignment of workers to ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. The equation still needs to be
instrumented due to the presence of the lagged wage on the right-hand side which is corre-
lated with µit−1. Equation (12) states that conditional on observed innate ability, individual
characteristics and ﬁrm size assignments each period are uncorrelated with the error term in
the wage equation (5). Therefore, this condition provides a set of potentially valid instruments
with the property that they are not correlated with the µ terms in the e term from equation
(8). In particular, the history of previous period ﬁrm size assignments (interaction terms be-
tween Dijt−1 and Dijt) as well as previous period ﬁrm size assignment interacted with skills
should help predict wages.
3 Data and Preliminary Analysis
In this section we describe the data focusing, in particular, on worker mobility across ﬁrms
of diﬀerent sizes. We also present an analysis of the size-wage gap in the same spirit as the
empirical literature on ﬁrm size and wage outcomes. We use data from the Survey of Labour
and Income Dynamics (SLID). The SLID data is collected by Statistics Canada in the form
of a 6 year panel containing information about individuals. In particular, an extensive set of
individual and job characteristics are available for each of the six years of each panel, which
runs from 1993 to 1998. We select individuals between 20 and 64 years of age, working for
positive wages in sectors other than construction, and for whom we have observations on
at least three consecutive years. We limit the sample to those who answered questions about13
wages, education and ﬁrm size. These restrictions leave us with a sample of 17,766 observations
(worker-year) of which around 24% are associated with a change in ﬁrm size.
Following other work in the area, we categorize ﬁrm size as large (more than 1000 employ-
ees) medium (between 500 and 999 employees) and small (less than 500 employees). Table
1 shows diﬀerent ﬁrm and worker characteristics by ﬁrm size. In general, wages in large and
medium ﬁrms are about 21% higher than in small ﬁrms. However, workers in large and medium
ﬁrms have higher levels of education and more experience as well. Additionally, there is evi-
dence in the literature that union coverage may be a factor aﬀecting the size wage gap. Indeed,
unionization increases by half in large ﬁrms, where it covers 62% of the workers, relative to
small ﬁrms, where unionization rate is 42%.
In the analysis hereafter, we consider the distribution of other job characteristics that could
be related to wage dispersion across ﬁrm size. In particular, we contemplate the possibility that
large and small ﬁrms make diﬀerent use of complementary forms of compensation, like receiving
a pension plan or commissions and tips. This is in fact the case looking at the descriptive
statistics in table 1, since large (and medium) ﬁrms are more likely to oﬀer a pension plan.
Workers in large ﬁrms are also more likely to obtain commissions. We also consider other work
practices, not related to compensation, that may make a job more (less) attractive. These
are mainly related to job responsibilities, like whether the worker has the ability to inﬂuence
budget or staﬀ decisions, if he/she is involved in pay and promotion decisions, or whether
he/she supervise others. These, however, do not show a distinct pattern by ﬁrm size.
3.1 Analysis of Firm Size Changes
To explore whether individuals perceive ﬁrm size to be a relevant variable in their choice of
job, we take a further look at workers that report a change in ﬁrm size. Table 2 presents the
transition probabilities of ﬁrm size change, together with the average wage levels and rate of14
growth. Overall, 43.5% of the observations are in small ﬁrms, 11.4% in medium ﬁrms and
45.1% in large ﬁrms in period t. Interestingly, the percentages of moves out of any categories
(small, large or medium) is very similar varying between 3.3% and 4.6%. In other words, the
24% of observations reporting changes are evenly distributed across ﬁrm size.
In terms of average gains associated with moving, one can see that moves to large ﬁrms
(either out of medium or small ﬁrms) are associated with greater average wages and greater
wage growth. Interestingly, moving out of large ﬁrms does not necessarily imply a cut in wage
growth. This observation is in line with a selection model in which workers move out of “bad”
matches and into better matches. Note also that there does not seem to be a monotonic pattern
of increase in average wages or wage growth when comparing moves to a larger ﬁrm (small to
medium, medium to large) in that although moves from medium to large ﬁrms are associated
with greater gains (in level and growth), moves from small to medium are not. This suggests
the presence of asymmetry in the characteristics inﬂuencing ﬁrm size changers.
Because some of the moves may not reﬂect a worker move but either misclassiﬁcation in
ﬁrm size between two years or the fact that the same ﬁrm is expanding or shrinking over time
(due to substantial hiring or layoﬀs), we are interested in analyzing further the relevance of
the reported moves. We therefore looked into the factors that may inﬂuence the probability of
moving to a ﬁrm of a diﬀerent size. To this eﬀect we run a probit estimation on ﬁrm size change
that includes education, experience, union status, and diﬀerent forms of past compensation
among the main explanatory variables to be used as possible factors correlated with moves.
We consider the possibility that moving to a larger ﬁrm represents a diﬀerent type of choice
for the workers than moving to a smaller ﬁrm and the dependent variable is an indicator for
whether the worker moved to a larger ﬁrm. 15
15Moving to a smaller ﬁrm shows similar returns, except that the coeﬃcient for the commission variable is
not signiﬁcant. These results are available from the authors upon request.15
The results of the probit analysis are presented in table 3. In general, low levels of education
and experience are negatively correlated with the probability of moving to larger ﬁrms, whereas
unionization is positively correlated. These eﬀects were also apparent in the raw data. The
most interesting results come from the variables related to work compensation. In the ﬁrst
column we use past wages (in levels) to measure the main form of compensation, and in the
second column we use past wage growth for this purpose. In both columns, the main form
of compensation (either past wage or past wage growth) have a (strong) negative inﬂuence in
the probability of moving to larger ﬁrms, suggesting that most moves are related to improved
pay opportunities. Other forms of compensation also appear to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the
probability of moving to larger ﬁrms. Those that received tips or commissions in the past are
less likely to move. This is likely to happen because these forms of compensation are usually
linked to the development of a clientele or other ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments. It is worth noting
that these variables are not signiﬁcant when we analyze the probability of moving to small
ﬁrms, 16 which again points to asymmetries in the type of ﬁrm size changers.
Overall, the above examination of the data seems to support the idea that observable skills
are rewarded diﬀerently among large and small ﬁrms. There also seems to exist an asymmetry
in the moves to large and small ﬁrms, in terms of wage compensation. Finally, the results from
the probit analysis are intuitive in that movers to larger ﬁrms are on average more educated,
less experienced and that moves follow from poor pay outcomes at the current ﬁrm.
3.2 The Size-Wage Gap
In this section we replicate the analysis performed in previous empirical studies analyzing
the links between ﬁrm size and wages. Empirical studies on the determinants of wage and
wage growth have analyzed possible departures from the basic Mincer-type wage equation
16Results available upon request.16
that explains wages as a function of education and a quadratic in experience. Since the wage
equation is originally derived from a model of optimal investment in human capital, it does not
oﬀer a complete representation of the labor market as it only describes the supply side of the
market. Most studies add variables to the wage equation that describe and capture variations
in wages related to the demand side of the labor market. In particular, industry, occupation,
unionization, establishment and ﬁrm size dummies are the main variables employed. This type
of analysis allows one to obtain an estimate of the average size-wage gap.
Table 4 presents the results of a cross-sectional OLS estimation of employer-size wage
diﬀerentials in the spirit of the empirical literature on ﬁrm size and wage outcomes. Overall, the
results are similar to those reported elsewhere in the literature. Column (I) shows the average
size-wage gap in the absence of other ﬁrm controls. The coeﬃcient associated with the dummy
for a large and a medium ﬁrm gives a wage diﬀerential of 15% and 12% respectively. This is
similar to those estimated in Morissette (1993) using the Canadian Labour Market Activity
Survey (LMAS) for 1986, which suggests that the magnitude of the gaps has not changed over
time. Column (II) shows the results when controls for big establishment, unionized worker,
industry, occupation, and public sector workers are added to the wage equation. The size of the
coeﬃcients associated with ﬁrm size drops substantially to 8 % and 5% for large and medium
ﬁrms respectively. Overall, and similarly to others in the literature, we ﬁnd that employment
characteristics, such as a public sector, unionization or big establishment explain a sizeable
portion (around 50%) of the size wage gap. Industry and occupation variables have additional
though limited eﬀects.
The literature on ﬁrm size suggests that unionization has an important eﬀect in reducing
wage dispersion and that pay practices or other ﬁrm policies will diﬀer among unionized and
non unionized ﬁrms. Therefore, this is a factor that should be considered in our analysis.
Table A1 in the appendix compares the average wage by education level and ﬁrm size between17
unionized and non unionized ﬁrms. Note that the average union wage gap is much greater
among small ﬁrms than among large ﬁrms implying diﬀerent size eﬀects on wages for unionized
and non unionized workers. 17 Given these ﬁndings, we perform the same type of OLS analysis
concentrating only on the sub-sample of non union ﬁrms. The size-wage gap is indeed greater,
but only slightly, among large non unionized ﬁrms (9%).
Finally and most importantly, we exploit the temporal dimension of our data set to in-
vestigate the potential importance of unmeasured ability by comparing the OLS results with
the results of ﬁxed-eﬀect estimations. Column (IV) presents the estimates of the ﬁxed eﬀect
regression. Note how the coeﬃcient associated with the large ﬁrm dummy variable drops sub-
stantially, although remains statistically signiﬁcant. This indicates that the estimates of the
previous regressions (including our estimates on ﬁrm size) are very likely to suﬀer from ability
bias. This result is also consistent with the literature. In the next section, the role of ability
in the relationship between ﬁrm size and wages is investigated in greater detail following the
statistical model presented in section 2.
4 Results
In this section we present the results of estimations of wage equation (5) in which ﬁrm size
is interacted with measured skills and unmeasured ability implying diﬀerent wage policies for
ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes and workers sorting based on comparative advantage and ﬁrms screening.
Table 5 summarizes the results. We also assess the robustness of the method by performing
tests of the validity and predictive power of the instruments.
17See Lluis (2002) and Pearce (1990) for more details on this particular point for the Canadian case and
American case respectively.18
4.1 Returns to Unmeasured Ability by Firm Size
In the ﬁrst column of table 5, simple OLS are applied to estimate the wage equation assuming
unmeasured ability is equally rewarded in all ﬁrms. This ﬁrst empirical model serves as a
basis for comparison with the case where both measured and unmeasured skills are diﬀerently
rewarded across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. Note that we summarized workers characteristics into
a skill index to obtain a global measure of skills. 18 To do so, we estimated a regression of
the log wage on education, marital status, sex, nationality, experience and squared experience,
industry and occupation type for the entire original sample of workers. We then use the
estimated coeﬃcients related to education, marital status, gender, nationality and experience to
compute the estimated or predicted log wage based on these characteristics. The resulting skill
variable has been normalized to 0. Columns II to VI present the results of GMM estimations
of equation (7) based on the quasi-diﬀerencing method described in section 2.2. Column II
uses the full sample while column III considers younger workers, column IV and V use the
samples of non unionized workers in managerial and non managerial positions respectively.
The last column corresponds to an analysis check of the identiﬁcation test we will describe in
more details at the end of this section.
The results of the OLS estimation in column I show that the large ﬁrm dummy variable
or intercept is still signiﬁcant and that the returns to measured skills by ﬁrm size are also
signiﬁcant. On the other hand, a test of equality of these returns to measured skills cannot
reject the hypothesis that they are all equal. When unmeasured ability is considered (column
II-V), the returns to measured skills as well as the large ﬁrm eﬀect are substantially reduced,
as was the case in table 4 when comparing the OLS and ﬁxed-eﬀect estimations. This result
conﬁrms the importance of unmeasured ability in the relationship between ﬁrm size and wages.
18Given the focus on comparative advantage, this technique provides a way to minimize the number of
parameters to be estimated. It is similarly used in Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, Parent (2002) and Lluis (2002),19
It is worth noticing the eﬀect of other wage policy characteristics, such as pension plan
availability and commission, whose eﬀects are both substantial and signiﬁcant in the OLS
estimation in column I but drop in magnitude once ability is controlled for (column II-V).
Note, however, the signiﬁcant but small eﬀect of having a pension plan for non unionized
workers in columns IV and V, which suggests that pension plan holders are high-wage workers
even after controlling for ability. Also interestingly, after controlling for ability, the eﬀect of
commissions reduces base pay for younger workers (column III).
The most interesting results of table 5 relates to the returns to unmeasured skills. These
returns are signiﬁcant and more importantly, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another according
to the tests of equality of the coeﬃcients. They are also consistent across the diﬀerent sub-
samples studied (columns II-V) suggesting that the eﬀect is robust to diﬀerent sub-sample
related to workers’ age, union status or occupation.
In terms of the diﬀerential in returns, it is interesting to note the non monotonic relationship
between ﬁrm size and the level of the returns previously conjectured in the raw data. The
returns to unmeasured ability are the highest in medium size ﬁrms (above 500 and below 1000
workers). In other words, unmeasured ability is signiﬁcantly more rewarded in medium size
ﬁrms relative to small ﬁrms. On the other hand, unmeasured ability is not signiﬁcantly more
rewarded in large ﬁrms relative to medium or small ﬁrms. The ﬁrst result is in accordance
with an explanation based on ability sorting while the second piece is more consistent with
an explanation based on monitoring costs. Overall, it seems that ability sorting dominates for
moves from small to medium size ﬁrms in that ability is more productive and therefore more
rewarded in the latter than the former. On the other hand, when ﬁrms become“too large”,
the monitoring costs hypothesis seems to dominate in that ability is not more rewarded than
in small ﬁrms. 19
19The same analysis has been performed for diﬀerent categorizations of small, medium and large sizes and the20
4.2 Analysis of Instruments
To assess the robustness of the preceding results, we analyzed the predictive power of the
instruments used. To do so, we performed a F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of the instruments
when the instrumented variable (previous wages) is regressed on the instruments, including all
the exogenous variables in the right-hand side of the wage equation. The value of the F-test
statistic is 3.96 which is above the critical value at the 95% conﬁdence level. One can therefore
conclude that ﬁrm size aﬃliation between t − 1 and t as well as interactions between ﬁrm size
aﬃliation and skills are good instruments for workers’ previous period wage.
In terms of the validity of the instruments used to perform the estimation, the test is
rejected for the models represented in columns II to IV and not rejected only in the case
of non unionized non managerial workers (column V). Note that as explained in details in
Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2002), the non-linearity in the model estimated can
make the overidentiﬁcation test fail either because the instruments are invalid or because the
instruments are valid but the model is misspeciﬁed. One possible reason for misspeciﬁcation
is the restriction we have imposed that the wage model is a single-index model in that both
measured and unmeasured skills are uni-dimensional. Our model, like the one in Gibbons,
Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2002), is a multiple sector model for which a single measured
skills and ability index may be too restrictive. In addition, in this type of model, there are
diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies for estimating the slope and intercept associated with each
ﬁrm size variables. For example, moves to large ﬁrms can be identiﬁed both through moves
out of medium ﬁrms as well as moves out of small ﬁrms. Table 2 shows that about 5% of
the observations corresponds to these types of moves in each case which is substantial. We
follow Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2002) strategy to estimate the model with only
observations on adjacent moves. We perform the analysis on the sample of non unionized
results are similar with only weaker signiﬁcance levels. These results are not shown but available upon request.21
managerial workers (whose results are shown in column IV) to which we drop observations on
non-adjacent moves (small to large ﬁrms and vice-versa). One can see that the value of the
statistic of the overidentiﬁcation test decreases by half with a p-value such that the assumption
of valid instruments now cannot be rejected.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have re-examined the relationship between ﬁrm-size and wages by analyzing
diﬀerences in the way ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes evaluate workers’ skills and in particular unmea-
sured ability. Using a non linear instrumental variable estimator, we are able to estimate the
diﬀerential wage impact of unmeasured ability across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. Our data come
from the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) over the years 1996 to 2001. The
results can be summarized into three following main points:
A preliminary analysis of the data illustrated some diﬀerences in the compensation policies
of small, medium and large ﬁrms. In particular, large and medium ﬁrms are more likely to
oﬀer a pension plan and workers in large ﬁrms are also more likely to obtain commissions.
Also an analysis of the extent of ﬁrm size changes shows that 24% of observations report a
move to a ﬁrm of a diﬀerent size. These moves are evenly distributed across ﬁrm size in that
a similar proportion of moves are reported out of small, medium and large ﬁrms. In terms
of average gains associated with moving, moves to large ﬁrms (either out of medium or small
ﬁrms) is associated with greater average wage and wage growth. Interestingly, moving out of
large ﬁrms does not necessarily imply a cut in wage growth. Moreover, there does not seem to
be a monotonic pattern of increase in average wages or wage growth when comparing moves
to a larger ﬁrm (small to medium, medium to large) in that although moves from medium
to large ﬁrms are associated with greater gains (in level and growth), moves from small to22
medium are not. This suggests the presence of asymmetry in the characteristics inﬂuencing
ﬁrm size changers. Finally, a probit analysis for the determinants of ﬁrm size changes shows
intuitive correlations between workers and compensation characteristics and moves to larger
ﬁrms. Indeed, movers to larger ﬁrms are on average more educated, less experienced and we
also ﬁnd that moves follow from poor pay outcomes at the current ﬁrm.
From the GMM estimation of the statistical wage model, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the returns to unmeasured ability across ﬁrm size. In particular, we ﬁnd that the returns to
unmeasured ability are the highest in medium size ﬁrms (above 500 but below 1000 workers).
In other words, the returns to unmeasured ability are signiﬁcantly greater in medium size ﬁrms
relative to small ﬁrms but are not signiﬁcantly greater in large ﬁrms relative to medium or
small ﬁrms. Overall, it seems that ability sorting dominates for moves from small to medium
size ﬁrms in that ability is more productive and therefore more rewarded in the latter than
the former. When ﬁrms become “too large”, however, the monitoring costs hypothesis seems
to dominate in that ability is not more rewarded than in small ﬁrms.23
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Table 1. Average Sample Characteristics  
 
 




    
Hourly Wage  18.26 16.36  19.04  19.90 
Years of Experience  18.66 17.89  19.21  19.25 
Manager  0.20 0.20  0.18  0.21 
Union  0.54 0.42  0.66  0.62 
Public  0.38 0.30  0.49  0.43 
Female  0.47 0.53  0.46  0.42 
High School  0.27 0.25  0.23  0.30 
Post Secondary  0.42 0.43  0.42  0.40 
University  0.17 0.15  0.22  0.17 
Big Establishment  0.74 0.60  0.83  0.86 
Work Practices 
Budget/Staff   0.18 0.18  0.16  0.19 
Pay / Promotions  0.12 0.13  0.11  0.13 
Supervise Others  0.29 0.28  0.27  0.30 
Commission  0.23 0.20  0.22  0.26 
Pension Plan  0.72 0.54  0.83  0.88 
        
Observations  17,696 7,690 2,026 7,980 
* Large firms have more than 1000 employees. Medium Firms have between 500 and 
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Table 2. Transition Probabilities of Wage Practices 
 
 
Firm Size (t) 
 Firm Size (t-1)  Small  Medium  Large  Total 
Small  (%)  35.51  3.46   4.83   43.80  
Wage 16.86  19.69 19.29 17.37 
Wage growth %  2.81  2.77 3.18 2.85 
Commission %  18.75  20.15 18.63 19.64 
Pension Plan %  48.30  80.81 82.72 54.95 
Medium (%)  3.30   4.03   4.16   11.49  
Wage  18.95  19.85  19.96 19.63 
Wage growth %  2.24  2.28  4.07 2.98 
Commission %  18.12  24.59  18.60 20.68 
Pension Plan %  74.46  80.97  82.08 79.47 
Large (%)  4.65   3.96   36.10   44.71  
Wage  19.70 20.50  20.94  20.77 
Wage growth %  2.38 3.20  2.95  2.91 
Commission %  13.90 19.36  27.47  25.32 
Pension Plan % 81.61  85.19  88.12  87.17 
        
Total  43.46   11.45    45.09  100  
Wage  17.37 20.03  20.67  19.21 
Wage growth %  2.71 2.77  3.09  2.98 
Commission %  18.90 21.28  25.81  22.43 
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Table 3. Probit Estimates of Moving to Larger Firms 
 
Logit (I)    Logit (II) 
 
High School  - 0.100    - 0.220 
  (0.1401)   (0.1715) 
Post Secondary  0.150   0.089 
  (0.1281)   (0.1579) 
University  0.315   0.189 
  (0.1651)   (0.1912) 
Experience  - 0.011    - 0.005 
  (0.0222)   (0.0282) 
Exp2 (/100)  0.012   0.002 
  (0.0519)   (0.0632) 
Union  0.342   0.161 











  (0.1478)    
Wage Growth (t-1)  --   -0.441 
     (0.2886) 
Commission (t-1)  -0.388   -0.526 
  (0.1168)   (0.1479) 
Pension (t-1)  0.597   0.557 
  (0.1221)   (0.1524) 
Influence Pay (t-1)  0.019   0.041 
  (0.1584)   (0.1957) 
Observations  8,894   5,882 
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for moving to a larger firm. All regressions 
include controls for marital status, tenure and gender. Additional regressions (not shown here) 
that also control for industry and occupation show similar results   29
Table 4. The Size-Wage Gap  






High School  0.127 0.106  0.114    -0.016 
  (0.0103) (0.0103)  (0.0165)    (0.0315) 
Post Secondary  0.269 0.225  0.233    0.016 
  (0.0094) (0.0094)  (0.0152)    (0.0321) 
University  0.557 0.456  0.460    0.080 
  (0.0117) (0.0126)  (0.0217)    (0.0595) 
Experience  0.025 0.021  0.029    0.040 
  0.0017 0.0017  0.0025    0.0020 
Exp2 (/100)  -0.034 -0.030  -0.040    -0.03 
  0.0041 0.0041  0.0063    0.0048 
Large Firm  0.141 0.076  0.087    0.015 
  0.0073 0.0075  0.0122    0.0047 
Medium Firm  0.109 0.051  0.050    0.009 
  0.0108 0.0106  0.0179    0.0052 
Big Establishment  -- 0.095  0.108    -0.000 
   0.0089  0.0126    0.0055 
Public  -- 0.169  0.199    -0.005 
   0.0116  0.0221    0.0199 
Union   0.084  --    0.012 
   0.0084      0.0068 
Ind./ Occ.  -- Yes  Yes    Yes 
          
Observations   17,696 17,696 8,200    17,696 
R-squared / within  0.401 0.474  0.534    0.085 
NOTE: All regressions include controls for marital status, gender, immigrant, visible minority, 
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Table 5. Returns to Unmeasured Skills by Firm Size 
 
































  (0.008) (0.017) (0.023)  (0.045)  (0.025)  (0.052 
Large Firm  0.041*** 0.014*  0.012 -0.000  0.029**   0.054 
  (0.005) (0.008) (0.013)  (0.021)  (0.014)  (0.050) 
Commission  0.023*** -0.009  -0.015*** -0.003 -0.007  -0.005 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
Pension Plan  0.157*** 0.004  0.001 0.022*  0.021*** 0.018   
  (0.157) (0.006) (0.007)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.013) 
Returns to Measured 
Skills 
         
     Small Firm  0.359*** 0.161*** 0.166*** 0.153***  0.181*** 0.189*** 
 (0.008)  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.061)  (0.073)  (0.064) 
     Medium Firm  0.335***  0.002 0.097  0.014 0.119   0.049 
 (0.016)  (0.067)  (0.079)  (0.109)  (0.138)  (0.114) 
     Large Firm  0.363***  0.092* 0.093*  0.210***  0.186*** 0.137*** 
  (0.007) (0.051) (0.058)  (0.069)  (0.071)  (0.110) 
Test for Equality of 
Returns 
         
     S=M  1.73  3.46  0.46  1.18  0.10  1.09 
(p-value) (0.18)  (0.06)  (0.49)  (0.28)  (0.75)  (0.29) 
     M=L  2.29  0.90  0.00  1.92  0.12  0.26 
(p-value) (0.13)  (0.34)  (0.97)  (0.17)  (0.72)  (0.60) 
Returns to 
Unmeasured Skills 
         
     Small Firm    1  1  1  1  1 
            
     Medium Firm    1.473***  1.585*** 1.533***  1.329*** 1.523*** 
   (0.218)  (0.228)  (0.264)  (0.255)  (0.303) 
     Large Firm    1.164***  1.263*** 0.922***  0.915*** 0.966*** 
   (0.205)  (0.220)  (0.204)  (0.161)  (0.373) 
Tests for Equality of 
Returns 
         
     S=M    4.68  6.58  4.07  1.66  2.98 
(p-value)   (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.19)  (0.08) 
     M=L    3.61  2.71  8.65  4.39  5.20 
(p-value)   (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Overidentification 
Test 
 66.00  56.71  62.10  30.76  30.10 
(p-value)   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.50)  (0.50) 
N  17696 17696 12030  3288  4912  3016 
 
NOTE: All regressions include controls for marital status, gender, immigrant, visible minority, language, 
province, cma and year. The tests for equality of returns are c2 tests. 
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Table A1. Average Wage by Education, Firm Size and Union Status 
 
  Non Union  Union  TOTAL 
 
Small                    Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large
Less than HS  11.75                      13.01 13.65 12.26 14.37 15.15 17.91 16.31 12.73 14.4 16.79
High School  13.47                      16.54 17.05 15.16 16.25 16.70 19.11 18.04 14.38 16.63 18.24
Post Secondary  15.28                      17.43 18.94 16.75 18.26 19.17 20.05 19.30 16.53 18.59 19.64
University  22.31                      27.63 27.26 25.27 24.07 24.37 24.62 24.37 23.36 25.32 25.67
                  
Average  14.83                      18.45 19.36 16.80 18.50 19.35 20.23 19.53 16.36 19.04 19.90
Observations  4,494  698  3,008  8,200  3,196  1,328  4,972  9,496  7,690    2,026   7,980 
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